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Abstract
Uncertain wiretap channels are introduced. Their zero-error secrecy capacity is
defined. If the sensor-estimator channel is perfect, it is also calculated. Further prop-
erties are discussed. The problem of estimating a dynamical system with nonstochastic
disturbances is studied where the sensor is connected to the estimator and an eaves-
dropper via an uncertain wiretap channel. The estimator should obtain a uniformly
bounded estimation error whereas the eavesdropper’s error should tend to infinity. It
is proved that the system can be estimated securely if the zero-error capacity of the
sensor-estimator channel is strictly larger than the logarithm of the system’s unstable
pole and the zero-error secrecy capacity of the uncertain wiretap channel is positive.
1 Introduction
If “independent noise” is assumed for every time step, it tends to be considered as stochastic
in information theory. In contrast to this, in robust control theory it is common to consider
dynamical systems with nonstochastic disturbances. In order to give a unified framework
for the latter case, Nair has proposed a “nonstochastic information theory” [1]. The basic
channel model in [1] is the newly introduced uncertain channel, a rule which determines
which channel input can generate which channel outputs without weighting the possible
outputs given the inputs. For finite alphabets, every uncertain channel thus corresponds to
a 0-1-matrix obtained from a stochastic matrix by replacing every positive entry by 1. Thus,
uncertain channels are natural objects in zero-error information theory. Nair also introduced
an analog to mutual information which plays the same role for the zero-error capacity of
uncertain channels as mutual information for the capacity of discrete memoryless channels.
In [1], Nair applied his nonstochastic information theory to the problem of estimating
an unstable scalar dynamical system with nonstochastic disturbances at a remote location
which obtains sensor data through an uncertain channel T. He showed that the estimation
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error can be bounded uniformly if the zero-error capacity C0(T) of T is strictly larger than
the logarithm of the system’s unstable pole λ > 1. This is “almost” necessary as well in the
sense that C0(T) ≥ logλ is required for uniform boundedness of the estimation error.
In this paper we add to the above problem that an eavesdropper overhears the commu-
nication between sensor and estimator via a second uncertain channel. The estimation error
at the intended location should again be bounded uniformly, whereas for every eavesdrop-
per output sequence there should be two system paths whose distance tends to infinity with
increasing time. We call this the problem of secure estimation. A similar problem has been
studied in [2] for the case of stochastic system and channel noise.
For our nonstochastic setting, this leads to the introduction of the uncertain wiretap
channel: a pair (TB,TC) of uncertain channels with common input alphabet. A zero-error
wiretap code is a zero-error code for TB such that every eavesdropper output word can
be generated by at least two different messages. Surprisingly, positivity of the zero-error
secrecy capacity C0(TB,TC) is sufficient, in addition to Nair’s sufficient condition for a
bounded estimation error, in order for secure estimation to be possible. The reason for this
is that the system’s instability helps to achieve the goal of security as soon as a sufficiently
large error on the eavesdropper side has been introduced at the beginning of transmission.
The schemes for data transmission from the sensor to the estimator apply block codes.
Thus there are inter-decoding times where no new data arrive at the estimator. The error
at those times increases with communication delay. On the other hand, we show that the
estimation error at decoding times can be made to vanish asymptotically at the cost of
increased delay. Similarly, we provide a lower bound on the speed of divergence for the
eavesdropper’s error which increases with increasing delay.
We calculate the secrecy capacity in the case of a perfect sensor-estimator channel. It
either equals zero or the logarithm of the size of the input alphabet. An example shows that
for general uncertain wiretap channels, no secure message transmission may be possible at
blocklength 1, whereas a positive transmission rate is achieved for blocklengths ≥ 2. It also
shows that encoders for zero-error wiretap codes in general have to be strictly uncertain
channels, i. e. every message can be mapped to several possible codewords similar to the use
of stochastic encoders for stochastic wiretap channels. We do not apply Nair’s nonstochastic
information-theoretic quantities in any of the analyses. Further, uncertain wiretap channels
do not appear to provide new insights for the study of zero-error capacity, an overview of
which is given in [3].
Outline: Section II describes the problems considered, Section III presents the results
and Section IV contains the proofs.
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Figure 1: The channel from Example 2. A line between ai and bj indicates that bj ∈ TB(ai),
similar for ai and cj.
2 Model
2.1 Uncertain Channels
Let A,B be finite alphabets. An uncertain channel from A to B is a mapping T : A →
2B∗ := 2
B \ {∅}. For any a ∈ A, the set T(a) is the family of possible output values of the
channel given the input a. Only one of the elements of T(a) will actually be attained when
transmitting a. That T(a) 6= ∅ for all a means that every input generates an output. We
will write ran(T) for the set of possible outputs of T, i. e. ran(T) = ∪a∈AT(a).
An M -code is a collection {F(m) : 1 ≤ m ≤ M} of nonempty and mutually disjoint
subsets of A. This is equivalent to an uncertain channel F : {1, . . . ,M} → 2A∗ with disjoint
output sets, so we will often denote such a code by F. The necessity of codes with |F(m)| ≥ 2
for somem is shown in Examples 1 and 2. It is similar to the necessity of stochastic encoders
for stochastic wiretap channels.
Obviously, first applying F and then T leads to a new uncertain channel T ◦ F :
{1, . . . ,M} → 2B∗ called the composition of F and T. Formally, we have for any m ∈
{1, . . . ,M}
(T ◦ F)(m) := T(F(m)) :=
⋃
a∈F(m)
T(a).
A nonstochastic M -code F is called a zero-error M -code for T if for any m,m′ ∈
{1, . . . ,M} with m 6= m′
T(F(m)) ∩T(F(m′)) = ∅. (1)
Thus every possible channel output y ∈ ran(T ◦ F) can be associated to a unique message
m. For this to hold it is necessary that the sets F(m) be disjoint, which is the reason for
this assumption in the definition of M -codes.
Given an additional finite alphabet C, an uncertain wiretap channel is a pair of uncertain
channels (TB : A → 2
B
∗ ,TC : A → 2
C
∗ ). The interpretation is that the outputs of channel
TB are received by the intended receiver, whereas the outputs of TC are heard by an
eavesdropper. See Fig. 1 for an example of an uncertain wiretap channel.
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An M -code F is called a zero-error wiretap M -code for (TB ,TC) if it is a zero-error
code for TB and additionally for every c ∈ ran(TC ◦ F) there are messages m 6= m
′ such
that
c ∈ TC(F(m)) ∩TC(F(m
′)). (2)
Thus every output c ∈ ran(TC ◦ F) can be generated by at least two possible messages.
We define the n-fold product of an uncertain channel T : A → 2B∗ as the uncertain
channel Tn : An → (2B∗ )
n defined by
Tn(an) = T(a1)× · · · ×T(an). (3)
We call an M -code F on the alphabet An an (M,n)-code. Given an uncertain channel
T, an (M,n)-code F is called a zero-error (M,n)-code for T if (1) is satisfied with T ◦ F
replaced by Tn ◦F. We set NT(n) to be the maximal M such that there exists a zero-error
(M,n)-code for T and define the zero-error capacity of T by
C0(T) := sup
n
logNT(n)
n
. (4)
Given an uncertain wiretap channel (TB,TC), an (M,n)-code F is called a zero-error wire-
tap (M,n)-code for (TB ,TC) if it is a zero-error code for TB and if (2) holds with TC ◦ F
replaced by TnC ◦ F. We define N(TB ,TC)(n) to be the maximal M such that there exists a
zero-error wiretap (M,n)-code for (TB,TC). Then
C0(TB,TC) := sup
n
logN(TB ,TC)(n)
n
(5)
is called the zero-error secrecy capacity of (TB ,TC). Due to the superadditivity of the
sequences logNT(n) and logN(TB ,TC)(n), the suprema in (4) and (5) can be replaced by
limits by the well-known Fekete’s lemma [4], see also [5].
2.2 The Unstable Dynamical System
Let λ > 1 and consider the real-valued system
x(t+ 1) = λx(t) + w(t), (6a)
x(0) = 0. (6b)
where w(t) is a nonstochastic disturbance with range [−Ω/2,Ω/2] for some Ω > 0. With
Ω˜(t) :=
Ω
λ− 1
(λt − 1), (7)
the range of possible values of this system at time t equals [−Ω˜(t)/2, Ω˜(t)/2], whose diameter
grows exponentially in t. A sensor performs perfect state measurements, encodes them and
sends them through an uncertain wiretap channel (TB ,TC). The dynamic system and the
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channel are synchronous, i. e. one symbol can be transmitted through the channel at every
system time step. The goal is that the receiver of TB (the estimator) be able to estimate
the state with bounded estimation error and the eavesdropper’s estimation error tend to
infinity.
Formally, a transmission scheme (nk, fk, ϕk)
∞
k=1 consists of a bounded sequence of pos-
itive natural numbers (nk)
∞
k=1 and, defining tk :=
∑k
i=1 ni, for each k ∈ N an uncertain
channel fk : R
tk → 2X
nk
∗ and a mapping ϕk : Y
tk → Rnk . Every uncertain channel fk maps
the observations of the system state up till time tk into one of several possible codewords
of length nk. The receiver of TB uses ϕk to produce from all symbols received so far an
estimate xˆ(tk), . . . , xˆ(tk+1 − 1) of the system states x(tk), . . . , x(tk+1 − 1).
The minimal delay which has to be tolerated is maxk nk. At this delay, the receiver
has good estimates for the states at times tk but has to extrapolate for the states x(tk +
1), . . . , x(tk+1−1). In particular, for the first t1−1 steps of the evolution, the estimator has
to rely on a rule which is independent of any observations and which we assume to estimate
xˆ(t) = 0 (0 ≤ t ≤ t1− 1). Further, every system path (x(t))
∞
t=0 generates a sequence (ct)
∞
t=1
of eavesdropper outputs.
Given a transmission scheme (nk, fk, ϕk)
∞
k=1 and a sequence of estimates (xˆ(t))
∞
t=0, we
denote by RB((xˆ(t))
∞
t=0) the set of system paths (x(t))
∞
t=0 which using the transmission
scheme can generate (xˆ(t))∞t=0. One can consider RB as an uncertain channel in the re-
verse direction with R∞ as input and output alphabet. Similarly, for any infinite sequence
(ct)
∞
t=1 ∈ Z
∞ of eavesdropper outputs, we denote by RC((ct)
∞
t=1) the set of system paths
(x(t))∞t=0 which can give rise to (ct)
∞
t=1.
For two sequences (at)
∞
t=1 and (bt)
∞
t=1 let us define their distance to be ‖(at)− (bt)‖∞ :=
supt|at − bt|. For a set S of sequences we define its diameter by
diam(S) := sup{‖(at)− (bt)‖∞ : (at), (bt) ∈ S}.
The transmission scheme (nk, fk, ϕk)
∞
k=1 is called reliable if the estimation error is bounded
uniformly in the estimates, i. e. there exists a constant κ > 0 such that for every possible
estimate sequence (xˆ(t))∞t=0,
sup{‖(x(t))− (xˆ(t))‖∞ : (x(t))
∞
t=0 ∈ RB((xˆ(t))
∞
t=0)} ≤ κ.
Further, (nk, fk, ϕk)
∞
k=1 is called secure if for every sequence (ct)
∞
t=1 ⊂ C
∞
diam(RC((ct)
∞
t=1)) =∞.
Note that security is an asymptotic property due to the boundedness of the range of possible
system states in any finite time horizon, cf. (7). Upon receiving a sequence (ct)
∞
t=1 of channel
outputs generated by a secure transmission scheme, the eavesdropper will not be able to
estimate the system path (x(t))∞t=0 that generated (ct)
∞
t=1 with a bounded estimation error.
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3 Results
3.1 Main Results
Theorem 1. A reliable and secure transmission scheme exists if C0(TB) > logλ and
C0(TB,TC) > 0.
The main idea behind Theorem 1 is that the system’s instability helps to achieve the goal
of security as soon as a sufficiently large error on the eavesdropper side has been introduced
at the beginning of transmission.
To apply Theorem 1, C0(TB) and C0(TB ,TC) have to be known. However, the zero-
error capacity C0(TB) is unknown for most channels except a few special cases, cf. [3].
Neither do we provide a general formula for C0(TB ,TC) here. A solution can be given,
though, when the calculation of C0(TB) is trivial.
Theorem 2. If TB is an injective function from A to B, then C0(TB ,TC) ∈ {0, log|A|}.
Further, C0(TB ,TC) = 0 if and only if there is no zero-error wiretap (M, 1)-code for
(TB ,TC) for any M ≥ 2.
For the proof of Theorem 2, it is sufficient to consider codes with |F(m)| = 1 for all
1 ≤ m ≤ M . The number of those elements of An which cannot be used as codewords
grows exponentially, at a rate which is less than log|A| if and only if there is no zero-error
wiretap (M, 1) code for (TB,TC) for any M ≥ 2. Thus the number of elements of A
n that
can be used either asymptotically grows with rate log|A| or equals 0.
3.2 Estimation Error and Divergence Coefficient
We study some additional properties of secure estimation schemes. As mentioned above,
using a transmission scheme (nk, fk, ϕk)
∞
k=1 with delay maxk nk, the estimates of system
states x(t) with t 6= tk (k ∈ N) have to be extrapolated from the last good estimate. Thus
the estimation error after a decoding time tk grows exponentially until the next decoding
time tk+1. However, for any ε > 0 the estimation error at times (tk)
∞
k=1 can be made
smaller than ε at least for large k if the inter-decoding intervals nk (k ∈ N) (and thus the
inter-decoding estimate errors) are sufficiently large:
Lemma 1. For every ε > 0 there exists a transmission scheme such that for every sequence
(xˆ(t))∞t=0 of estimates and every (x(t))
∞
t=0 ∈ RB((xˆ(t))
∞
t=0),
lim sup
k→∞
|x(tk)− xˆ(tk)| ≤ ε.
If C0(TB ,TC) > logλ, then the limit superior can even be replaced by a supremum.
Another parameter of interest is the speed of divergence of the diameter of the set of
possible system states given eavesdropper outputs (ct)
T
t=1 as T → ∞. Given a zero-error
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wiretap (M,n)-code F, we define for every possible eavesdropper channel output (ct)
n
t=1 ∈
ran(TnC ◦ F)
δ((ct)
n
t=1) = max{|m−m
′|+ 1 : (ct)
n
t=1 ∈ T
n
C(F(m)) ∩T
n
C(F(m
′))}.
Clearly 2 ≤ δ((ct)
n
t=1) ≤M . We then set
L := min{δ((ct)
n
t=1) : (ct)
n
t=1 ∈ ran(T
n
C ◦ F)}
and call F a (M,L, n)-code. We also define
∆(TB ,TC)(n) := max
{
L− 1
M − 1
: F is (M,L, n)-code
}
.
Clearly, 0 < ∆(TB ,TC)(n) ≤ 1.
Lemma 2. For every ε > 0 there exists a transmission scheme (nk, fk, ϕk)
∞
k=1 such that for
every eavesdropper output sequence (ct)
∞
t=1 there exist system paths (x(t))
∞
t=1, (x
′(t))∞t=1 ∈
RC((ct)
∞
t=1) satisfying
lim inf
T→∞
‖(x(t))Tt=1 − (x
′(t))Tt=1‖∞
λT
≥
Ω
λ− 1
sup
n
∆(TB ,TC)(n)− ε.
The term on the right-hand side of the inequality in Lemma 2 is positive if ε is cho-
sen small enough. The case supn∆(TB ,TC)(n) = 1 corresponds to complete eavesdropper
ignorance, cf. (7).
3.3 Uncertain Wiretap Channels
We first note that the divergence coefficient increases with increasing blocklength (and hence
delay). Thus we find a trade-off between the growth rate for the eavesdropper’s estimation
error and the delay:
Lemma 3. If C0(TB ,TC) > 0, then
sup
n
∆(TB ,TC)(n) = lim
n→∞
∆(TB ,TC)(n) > 0.
Next we have a closer look at the zero-error secrecy capacity of uncertain wiretap chan-
nels. To study the zero-error capacity of an uncertain channel T : A→ 2B∗ , one associates to
it the following graph G(T): its vertex set equals A and an edge is drawn between a, a′ ∈ A
if T(a) ∩T(a′) 6= ∅. In that case we write a ∼ a′.
The graph G(Tn) corresponding to the n-fold product channel Tn (see (3)) is the strong
n-fold product of G(T) denoted by G(T)n, in particular G(Tn) = G(T)n. Here for any
graph G with vertex set A, the strong product G2 of G with itself is defined as follows: The
vertex set of G2 is A2 and (a1, a2) ∼ (a
′
1, a
′
2) if 1) a1 ∼ a
′
1 and a2 = a
′
2 or 2) a2 ∼ a
′
2 and
a1 = a
′
1 or 3) a1 ∼ a
′
1 and a2 ∼ a
′
2.
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Figure 2: The channel (TB ,TC) from Example 1. A line between ai and bj indicates that
bj ∈ TB(ai), similar for ai and cj .
Finding the zero-error capacity of T now amounts to finding the asymptotic behavior as
n→∞ of the sizes of maximal independent systems of the graphs G(Tn), cf. [3]. We define
an independent system in a graph as a set {F(1), . . . ,F(M)} of mutually disjoint subsets of
the vertex set A such that no two vertices a, a′ belonging to different subsets F(m) 6= F(m′)
are connected by an edge.
To treat uncertain wiretap channels (TB ,TC), we consider a hypergraph structure
H(TnC) induced on A
n in addition to the graph structure G(TnB). A hypergraph con-
sists of a vertex set together with a set of subsets, called hyperedges, of this vertex set. The
vertex set of H(TnC) equals A
n. Every hyperedge is generated by a (ct)
n
t=1 ∈ C
n: we set
e((ct)
n
t=1) := {(at)
n
t=1 ∈ A
n : (ct)
n
t=1 ∈ T
n
C((at)
n
t=1)}.
It is easy to see that H(TnC) is the n-fold square product H(TC)
n, cf. [6]. For any
hypergraph H with vertex set A and hyperedge set E ⊂ 2A, the square product H2 of H
with itself is defined as follows: The vertex set of H2 is A2 and the hyperedge set equals
E2 := {e× e′ : e, e′ ∈ E}.
A zero-error wiretap (M,n)-code F then is nothing but a collection of disjoint subsets
{F(1), . . . ,F(M)} of An satisfying the two following properties:
1. It is an independent system for G(TnB);
2. For every hyperedge e of H(TnC) there exist at least two different m,m
′ such that e
has nonempty intersection with both F(m) and F(m′).
This (hyper-)graph theoretic language is applied in the proof of Theorem 2. The following
very interesting example gives additional insight into the nature of general uncertain wiretap
channels and their secrecy capacity.
Example 1. Consider the wiretap channel (TB ,TC) from Fig. 2. A with G(TB) and
H(TC) is depicted on the left of Fig. 3, A
2 with G(T2B) and H(T
2
C) on its right. It is easy
to check that there is no zero-error wiretap (M, 1)-code for any M ≥ 2. On the other hand,
a zero-error wiretap (4, 2)-code exists by chooosing the codeword sets as indicated in Fig.
3. Therefore in the general case, in contrast to the situation in Lemma 2, there is no easy
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Figure 3: Left: A with G(TB) and H(TC). Right: A
2 with G(T2B) and H(T
2
C). Vertices
connected by a solid black line are connected in G(TB) or G(T
2
B), respectively. Vertices
within the boundary of a blue dotted line belong to the same hyperedge ofH(TC) orH(T
2
C),
respectively.
criterion an uncertain wiretap channel satisfies at blocklength 1 if and only if its zero-error
secrecy capacity is positive.
This behavior of zero-error wiretap codes for general uncertain wiretap channels is re-
markable when it is compared to the behavior of zero-error codes for uncertain channels:
An uncertain channel T has C0(T) > 0 if and only if there exists an independent system
for G(T) with size ≥ 2. Similarly, a stochastic DMC has positive capacity if and only if its
blocklength-1 transmission matrix does not have identical rows. For the secrecy capacity of
stochastic wiretap channels, there is van Dijk’s criterion [7] for positivity which concerns the
blocklength-1 wiretap channel matrix and requires to check a certain function for concavity.
Observe also that in order to obtain a (4, 2)-code for the above channel, one message m
has to be encoded into a set with |F(m)| ≥ 2.
A simpler example illustrating the necessity of codes whose encoding sets F(m) are not
all one-element sets is the following.
Example 2. Consider the wiretap channel shown in Fig. 1. If one only considered codes
satisfying |F(m)| = 1 for all messages m, then the maximal M for which a zero-error
wiretap M -code exists would be M = 2, for example F = {{a1}, {a4}}. M = 4 is not
possible because TB can only transmit 3 messages without error. For M = 3, either c1 or
c2 would be generated by only one message.
On the other hand, if one takes the zero-error wiretap code F = {{a1}, {a2, a3}, {a4}},
then three messages can be distinguished at the intended receiver’s output and every eaves-
dropper output is reached by two different messages.
Moreover, examples can be constructed which show the following: If there exists a zero-
error wiretap (M,n)-code, then it may be necessary to have codes with |F(m)| ≥ 2 to also
find a zero-error wiretap (M ′, n)-code for every 2 ≤M ′ ≤M .
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4 Proofs
This section contains all the proofs. The first two subsections are devoted to the proof of
Theorem 1. Subsection 4.1 contains the quantizer rule applied by the sensor and some basic
lemmas which are needed in the analysis of the transmission scheme to be defined. The
transmission scheme is defined and analyzed in Subsection 4.2. The proofs of Lemmas 1
and 2 which are based on the transmission scheme defined in Subsection 4.2 are done in
Subsection 4.3. The proof of Theorem 2 is contained in Subsection 4.4, followed by the
proof of Lemma 3 in Subsection 4.5.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1: Preliminaries
The first choice to make is the quantizer used by the sensor. For sufficient generality, we
assume the rule (6a), but that x(0) ∈ I0 for some real interval I0. Let M ≥ 2 ∈ N.
Recursively define for t ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ m ≤M
[A(t), B(t)] = λIt−1 +
[
−
Ω
2
,
Ω
2
]
, (8)
Pm,t = A(t) + (B(t)−A(t))
[
m− 1
M
,
m
M
]
, (9)
mt = m if x(t) ∈ Pm,t, (10)
It = Pmt,t. (11)
In the definition of mt, an uncertain mapping is applied to associate x(t) to one of the two
possible values if it lies on the boundary between two partition intervals Pm,t, Pm+1,t.
For every t ∈ N, the interval It is the set of system states which are possible at time
t according to the sequence (mi)
n
i=t. The interval [A(t + 1), B(t + 1)] is the set of states
the system could be in at time t + 1 given that its state at time t is contained in It. The
sets Pm,t+1 : 1 ≤ m ≤ M form an equal-sized partition of [A(t + 1), B(t+ 1)], and mt+1 is
the index of the partition atom actually containing the system state. Clearly, every path
(x(t))∞t=0 generates an infinite sequence (mt)
∞
t=1.
The next lemma is needed in the analysis of the intended receiver’s estimation error and
proved by induction over the recursion (8)-(11).
Lemma 4. For every t ∈ N and 1 ≤ m ≤M ,
|Pm,t| =


(
λ
M
)t (
|I0| −
Ω
M−λ
)
+ Ω
M−λ
if λ 6=M,
|I0|+ t
Ω
M
if λ =M.
(12)
In particular, supt|It| <∞ if and only if λ < M . In that case
sup
t
|It| = max
{
|I0|,
Ω
M − λ
}
.
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Proof. Write It := [It,min, It,max] for every t ∈ N. Then note that by (8)
[A(t+ 1), B(t+ 1)] =
[
λIt,min −
Ω
2
, λIt,max +
Ω
2
]
, (13)
which implies that B(t+ 1)−A(t+ 1) = λ|It|+Ω. Hence by (11) and (9)
|Pm,t+1| =
B(t+ 1)−A(t+ 1)
M
=
λ
M
|It|+
Ω
M
. (14)
Next (12) is established by induction over t, using (14). It is simple if λ =M . Now assume
λ 6= M . Clearly the statement if true for t = 0. Using the induction hypothesis and (14),
we then get
|Pm,t+1| =
λ
M
|It|+
Ω
M
=
λ
M
((
λ
M
)t(
|I0| −
Ω
M − λ
)
+
Ω
M − λ
)
+
Ω
M
=
(
λ
M
)t+1(
|I0| −
Ω
M − λ
)
+
Ω
M − λ
(
λ
M
+
M − λ
M
)
=
(
λ
M
)t+1(
|I0| −
Ω
M − λ
)
+
Ω
M − λ
.
This completes the proof.
Denote by xˆ(t) the mid point of It for t ≥ 0. For the analysis of the diameter of the set
of paths compatible with the eavesdropper’s outputs, we first derive a recursion formula for
the sequence (xˆ(t))∞t=1 given a sequence of partition indices (mt)
∞
t=1.
Lemma 5. Let M ∈ N and for every t let 1 ≤ mt ≤ M . Let xˆ(t) be the mid point of
It = Pmt,t for t ∈ N. Define
σt :=
t∑
i=0
(
λ
M
)t
=
M
M − λ
(
1−
(
λ
M
)t+1)
.
Then for every t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
xˆ(t) = λt
{
xˆ(0)−
1
2
t−1∑
i=0
(
Ωσi
λi+1
+
|I0|
M i
)(
1−
2mi+1 − 1
M
)}
. (15)
Proof. For t ∈ N and 1 ≤ m ≤ M we set Pm,t = [Pm,t,min, Pm,t,max]. By definition,
11
xˆ(t+ 1) = Pmt+1,t+1,min + |P1,t+1|/2 (using |P1,t+1| = |Pm,t+1| for all 1 ≤ m ≤M). Then
xˆ(t+ 1) = A(t+ 1) + (mt+1 −
1
2
)|P1,t+1| by (9)
= λPmt,t,min −
Ω
2
+ (mt+1 −
1
2
)|P1,t+1| by (8)
= λxˆ(t)−
λ|P1,t|
2
−
Ω
2
+ (mt+1 −
1
2
)|P1,t+1| by def. of xˆ(t)
= λxˆ(t)−
λ|P1,t|
2
−
Ω
2
+ (mt+1 −
1
2
)
(
λ
M
|P1,t|+
Ω
M
)
by (14)
= λxˆ(t)−
λ|P1,t|+Ω
2
(
1−
2mt+1 − 1
M
)
. (16)
By Lemma 4 and (16)
xˆ(t+ 1) = λxˆ(t)−
(
λt+1|I0|
2M t
−
λt+1
2M t
Ω
M − λ
+
λ
2
Ω
M − λ
+
Ω
2
)(
1−
2mt+1 − 1
M
)
= λxˆ(t)−
(
λt+1|I0|
2M t
−
Ω
2
λt+1 − λM t − (M − λ)M t
M t(M − λ)
)(
1−
2mt+1 − 1
M
)
= λxˆ(t)−
(
λt+1|I0|
2M t
−
Ω
2
M
M − λ
λt+1 −M t+1
M t+1
)(
1−
2mt+1 − 1
M
)
= λxˆ(t)−
(
λt+1
M t
|I0|
2
+
Ω
2
σt
)(
1−
2mt+1 − 1
M
)
. (17)
Now we use induction to prove the claim. It is certainly correct for t = 0. Assume the claim
has been proven for all integers up to t. We obtain from (17)
xˆ(t+ 1) = λt+1
{
xˆ(0)−
1
2
t−1∑
i=0
(
Ωσi
λi+1
+
|I0|
M i
)(
1−
2mi+1 − 1
M
)}
−
λt+1
2
{(
Ωσt
λt+1
+
|I0|
M t
)(
1−
2mt+1 − 1
M
)}
= λt+1
{
xˆ(0)−
1
2
t∑
i=0
(
Ωσi
λi+1
+
|I0|
M i
)(
1−
2mi+1 − 1
M
)}
.
This completes the proof.
Next assume that we have two systems obeying (6a). The paths of one of them start
in an interval I0 and those of the other in an interval I
′
0 with |I0| = |I
′
0|. The same
quantizer rules (8)-(11) are applied for both systems, generating sequences (mt)
∞
t=1, (It)
∞
t=0
and (m′t)
∞
t=1, (I
′
t)
∞
t=0, respectively. For t ≥ 0, denote by xˆ(t) the mid point of It and by xˆ
′(t)
that of I ′t. The next two lemmas will be used in the security analysis of the scheme we are
going to define.
Lemma 6. Let L,M ≥ 2 and for every t let 1 ≤ m′t < mt ≤ M with mt −m
′
t ≥ L − 1.
Then
lim inf
t→∞
xˆ(t)− xˆ′(t)
λt
≥ xˆ(0)− xˆ′(0) +
L− 1
M − 1
(
Ω
λ− 1
+ |I0|
)
.
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Proof. By Lemma 5, for any n ∈ N,
xˆ(t)− xˆ′(t) = λt
(
xˆ(0)− xˆ′(0) +
Ω
M
t−1∑
i=0
σi
λi+1
(mi+1 −m
′
i+1) (18)
+ |I0|
t−1∑
i=0
1
M i+1
(mi+1 −m
′
i+1)
)
.
Observe that
σi
λi+1
=
M
M − λ
(
1
λi+1
−
1
M i+1
)
(19)
and recall that mt −m
′
t ≥ L− 1 for every t. Hence (18) can be lower-bounded by
λt
(
xˆ(0)− xˆ′(0) +
Ω(L− 1)
M − λ
t−1∑
i=0
(
1
λi+1
−
1
M i+1
)
+ |I0|(L− 1)
t−1∑
i=0
1
M i+1
)
= λt
(
xˆ(0)− xˆ′(0) +
Ω(L− 1)
M − λ
(
1− λ−t
λ− 1
−
1−M−t
M − 1
)
+ |I0|(L− 1)
1−M−t
M − 1
)
.
The theorem is proven once one observes that as t→∞,
Ω(L− 1)
M − λ
(
1− λ−t
λ− 1
−
1−M−t
M − 1
)
+ |I0|(L− 1)
1−M−t
M − 1
−→
Ω(L− 1)
M − λ
(
1
λ− 1
−
1
M − 1
)
+ |I0|(L− 1)
1
M − 1
=
Ω(L − 1)
M − λ
M − λ
(M − 1)(λ− 1)
+ |I0|(L− 1)
1
M − 1
=
L− 1
M − 1
(
Ω
λ− 1
+ |I0|
)
.
Lemma 7. Let M ∈ N and for every t let 1 ≤ mt,m
′
t ≤M . If
|xˆ(0)− xˆ′(0)| >
Ω
λ− 1
+ |I0|, (20)
then for every t = 1, 2, . . .
lim inf
t→∞
|xˆ(t)− xˆ′(t)|
λt
≥ |xˆ(0)− xˆ′(0)| −
Ω
λ− 1
− |I0|.
Proof. By Lemma 4,
|xˆ(t)− xˆ′(t)| = λt
∣∣∣∣∣(xˆ(0)− xˆ′(0)) + 1M
t−1∑
i=0
(
Ωσi
λi+1
+
|I0|
M i
)
(mi+1 −m
′
i+1)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (21)
By the triangle inequality, the absolute value term on the right-hand side of (21) is lower-
bounded by ∣∣∣∣∣|xˆ(0)− xˆ′(0)| −
∣∣∣∣ 1M
t−1∑
i=0
(
Ωσi
λi+1
+
|I0|
M i
)
(mi+1 −m
′
i+1)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ . (22)
13
Using (19),
∣∣∣∣ 1M
t−1∑
i=0
(
Ωσi
λi+1
+
|I0|
M i
)
(mi −m
′
i)
∣∣∣∣ (23)
≤
M − 1
M
t−1∑
i=0
(
ΩM
M − λ
(
1
λi+1
−
1
M i+1
)
+
|I0|
M i
)
= (M − 1)
{
Ω
M − λ
1− λ−t
λ− 1
+
(
|I0| −
Ω
M − λ
)
1−M−t
M − 1
}
=
Ω
M − λ
M − 1
λ− 1
(
1−
1
λt
)
+
(
|I0| −
Ω
M − λ
)(
1−
1
M t
)
. (24)
As t tends to infinity, (24) converges to
Ω
M − λ
(
M − 1
λ− 1
− 1
)
+ |I0| =
Ω
λ− 1
+ |I0|.
This proves the lemma.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1: Transmission Schemes
For any n ≥ 1, let us introduce the n-sampled system
x(n)(k + 1) = λnx(n)(k) + w(n)(k),
x(n)(0) = 0,
where w(n)(k) is a nonstochastic disturbance in the range [−Ω˜(n)/2, Ω˜(n)/2] (cf. (7)). The
n-sampled system describes the system (6) at the points 0, n, 2n, . . .
Let us first assume that C0(TB,TC) ≤ logλ. Choose n1,M1 such that 2 ≤ M1 < λ
n1
and M1 ≤ N(TB,TC)(n1) and choose n2 such that M2 := NTB (n2) > λ
n2 . Let L ≥ 2
be chosen such that there exists a zero-error wiretap (M1, L, n1)-code F and let G be a
zero-error (M2, n2)-code.
We define a transmission scheme as follows: We do the construction (8)-(11) for the n1-
sampled system withM replaced byM1 and with I0 = {0}, thus obtainingA
(n1)(k), B(n1)(k),
P
(n1)
m,k ,mk, I
(n1)
k (omitting the superscript (n1) at mk). For some K ∈ N to be chosen later
and 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we set
fk(x(0), . . . , x(kn1)) = F(mk)
The intended receiver uses the mid point xˆ(kn1) of P
(n1)
mk,k
as estimate of x(kn1). For k > K,
we first define A(n2)(k − K), B(n2)(k − K), P
(n2)
m,k−K ,mk−K , I
(n2)
k−K as in (8)-(11) but with
I0 = P
(n1)
mK ,K
(and again omitting the superscript (n2) at mk−K). We then set
fk(x(0), . . . , x(Kn1 + (k −K)n2) = G(mk−K)
Decoding/estimating goes as in the first K steps.
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As M2 > λ
n2 it is clear that the estimation error for the intended receiver at decoding
times (tk)
∞
k=1 equals
max
{
max
1≤k≤K
|P
(n1)
mk,k
|, sup
k
|P
(n2)
mk,k−K
|
}
<∞. (25)
More precisely, by Lemma 4, the maximum in the curly brackets in (25) equals
|PmK ,K | =
((
λn1
M1
− 1
)K)
Ω
λ− 1
λn1 − 1
λn1 −M1
(26)
and the supremum inside the curly brackets in (25) equals the maximum of (26) and
Ω
λ− 1
λn2 − 1
M2 − λn2
. (27)
Thus the intended receiver’s estimation error is bounded at decoding times. In between, it
can only grow finitely, so the total estimation error is bounded.
To prove security of the transmission scheme defined above, fix an ε > 0. Now assume
the eavesdropper receives a channel output sequence (ct)
∞
t=1. Lemma 6 implies the existence
of paths (x(t))∞t=0, (x
′(t))∞t=0 such that for sufficiently large K, the estimates at time Kn1
have distance
xˆ(Kn1)− xˆ
′(Kn1) ≥ λ
Kn1
(
L− 1
M1 − 1
Ω
λ− 1
− ε
)
(28)
(note that here, Lemma 6 has to be applied with |I0| = 0 and xˆ(0) = xˆ
′(0)). By choosing K
even larger if necessary, (20) is satisfied with its left-hand side replaced by |xˆ(Kn)− xˆ′(Kn)|
and the right-hand side by
Ω˜(n2)
λn2 − 1
+ |PmK ,K |. (29)
This can be seen by applying (28) and by using (26) to show that (29) equals
Ω˜(n2)
λn2 − 1
+ |P
(n1)
m,K | =
Ω
λ− 1
(
1 +
((
λn1
M1
)K
− 1
)
λn1 − 1
M1 − λn1
)
.
One can thus apply Lemma 7 to find that for sufficiently large k (and after enlarging K
again if necessary), the distance between xˆ(kn2) and xˆ
′(kn2) is lower-bounded by
λKn1+(k−K)n2
Ω
λ− 1
(
L− 1
M1 − 1
−
1
λKn1
−
(
1
MK1
−
1
λKn1
)
λn1 − 1
M1 − λn1
− 2ε
λ− 1
Ω
)
. (30)
This tends to infinity as k → ∞ and thus proves that the transmission scheme defined
satisfies security. We have thus proved that there exists a reliable and secure transmission
scheme in the case C0(TB) > logλ and 0 < C0(TB,TC) ≤ log λ.
Next we treat the case C0(TB ,TC) > log λ. The construction is simpler than the
previous case, as it applies the same zero-error wiretap code in every time step. Choose n
such that M := N(TB ,TC)(n) > λ
n. Let L ≥ 2 be chosen such that there exists a zero-error
wiretap (M,L, n)-code F.
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We define a transmission scheme as follows: The construction (8)-(11) is done for the
n-sampled system with I0 = {0} and thus obtain A
(n)(k), B(n)(k), P
(n)
m,k,mk, I
(n)
k (omitting
the superscript (n) at mk). We then set
fk(x(0), . . . , x(kn)) = F(mk).
Again, the intended receiver uses the mid point of P
(n)
mk,k
as estimate of x(kn).
By Lemma 4, the estimation error at times 0, n, 2n, . . . is bounded by
Ω
λ− 1
λn − 1
M − λn
. (31)
Between these times, the error grows, but stays bounded. Hence the total estimation error
is bounded, so the above transmission scheme is reliable.
For security, we apply Lemma 6 and find that for any ε > 0, any eavsdropper sequence
(ct)
∞
t=1) and sufficiently large k, there exist paths (x(t))
∞
t=0, (x
′(t))∞t=0 ∈ RC((ct)
∞
t=1) such
that
xˆ(kn)− xˆ′(kn) ≥ λkn
(
Ω
λ− 1
L− 1
M − 1
− ε
)
. (32)
Thus the transmission scheme also is secure. Altogether, this proves Theorem 1.
4.3 Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2
We distinguish the cases C0(TB ,TC) ≤ logλ and C0(TB ,TC) > logλ and treat both
lemmas for each case at once.
Let us start with the case C0(TB ,TC) ≤ logλ. The maximal estimation error at decod-
ing times 0, n1, . . . ,Kn1,Kn1 + n2,Kn1 + 2n2, . . . is given by (25), i. e. the maximum of
(26) and (27). The error (26) is obtained at time Kn1, whereas (27) is the asymptotic error
as k →∞. By choosing n2 sufficiently large, this asymptotic error can be made arbitrarily
small by choice of M2. Thus for any ε > 0 and for sufficiently large n2 = n2(ε), we obtain
|x(Kn1 + (k −K)n2)− xˆ(Kn1 + (k −K)n2)| ≤ ε.
This proves Lemma 1 for the case C0(TB ,TC) ≤ logλ.
To also show Lemma 2, we just need to have a look at (30). First we choose n1 so large
that
L− 1
M1 − 1
≥ sup
n
∆(TB ,TC)(n)− ε.
Thus the term in the outer brackets in (30) is lower bounded by
sup
n
∆(TB ,TC)(n)−
1
λKn1
−
(
1
MKn11
−
1
λKn1
)
λn1 − 1
M1 − λn1
− ε
(
1 + 2
λ− 1
Ω
)
Next with sufficiently large K, it can be ensured that
1
λKn1
+
(
1
MKn11
−
1
λKn1
)
λn1 − 1
M1 − λn1
+ ε
(
1 + 2
λ− 1
Ω
)
≤ 2ε
(
1 +
λ− 1
Ω
)
. (33)
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Recall that ε depends on K and can be made arbitrarily small by enlarging K. Hence the
term on the right-hand side of (33) can be made arbitrarily small. This proves Lemma 2
for the case C0(TB ,TC) ≤ logλ.
We next prove Lemmas 1 and 2 to also hold for the case C0(TB ,TC) > logλ. By
(31) and the choice of M , the estimation error at decoding times can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing n sufficiently large. Note that this gives the claimed upper bound on the
supremum of all estimation errors at decoding times. This proves Lemma 1. The proof of
Lemma 2 is simple as well because of (32).
4.4 Proof of Theorem 2
For the proof of Theorem 2, observe that one can restrict attention to codes with |F(m)| = 1
because no vertices are connected in G(TnB) for any n. At blocklength n, the only question
will be how many elements of An can be used as codewords. We write an1 := (a1, . . . , an)
for elements of An and use analogous notation for elements cn1 ∈ C
n. It has to be ensured
that the eavesdropper cannot infer the codeword an1 , and thus the message, from its received
cn1 ∈ C
n.
To formalize this, we introduce the notion of “subhypergraph” of a hypergraph. Given
a hypergraph H with vertex set V and hyperedge set EH , we call H˜ a subhypergraph of H
if the vertex set V˜ of H˜ is a subset of V and if each of the hyperedges of H˜ has the form
e˜ = e ∩ V˜ for some e ∈ EH (the empty set is not allowed as hyperedge). Obviously, the
subhypergraph H˜ is uniquely determined by V˜ and we denote it by H |
V˜
.
Denote by TnC |V the channel T
n
C restricted to inputs from V ⊂ A
n and observe that
the hypergraph H(TnC |V) is given by the subhypergraph H(T
n
C)|V of H(T
n
C). We can thus
formulate our problem by saying that we have to find a large subhypergraph H(n) of H(TnC)
which does not contain any hyperedge of cardinality 1.
This subhypergraph is found in several consecutive steps. We set H(TnC) =: H
(n)(0).
First we eliminate from the possible channel input alphabet An all elements an1 which can
be uniquely determined by the eavesdropper, i. e. all an1 such that {a
n
1} is a hyperedge of
H(n)(0). If we write
A
(n)
1 (1) := {a
n
1 ∈ A
n : {an1} is a hyperedge of H
(n)(0)},
and A
(n)
2 (1) := A
n \A
(n)
1 (1), we thus obtain the subhypergraph H
(n)(1) := H(n)(0)|
A
(n)
2 (1)
of H(n)(0).
Now H(n)(1) may again contain hyperedges with cardinality 1: precisely those which
have the form e′ = e ∩ A
(n)
2 (1) for a hyperedge e of H
(n)(0) which equals e = {an1 , a˜
n
1}
for some an1 ∈ A
(n)
1 (1) and a˜
n
1 ∈ A
(n)
2 (1). Thus again eliminating those elements a
n
1 from
A
(n)
2 (1) where {a
n
1} is a hyperedge of H
(n)(1), one arrives at a subhypergraph H(n)(2), and
so on.
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Formally, with A
(n)
2 (0) := A
n, we set for s ≥ 1
A
(n)
1 (s) := {a
n
1 ∈ A
(n)
2 (s− 1) : {a
n
1} is a hyperedge in H
(n)(s− 1)},
A
(n)
2 (s) := A
n \A
(n)
1 (s),
H(n)(s) := H(n)(s− 1)|
A
(n)
2 (s)
.
After a finite number S(n) of steps we arrive at a hypergraph H(n) := H(n)(S(n)) which is
either empty or does not contain any hyperedge of cardinality 1. We denote the vertex set
of H(n) by A
(n)
2 and define A
(n)
1 := A
n \A
(n)
2 . Observe that
An = A
(n)
2 (0) ⊃ A
(n)
2 (1) ⊃ . . . ⊃ A
(n)
2 (S
(n)) = A
(n)
2 ,
A(n)(1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ A(n)(S(n)) = A
(n)
1 . (34)
The main step now is to prove A
(n)
1 ⊂ (A
(1)
1 )
n for every n ≥ 1. Due to (34), this is
implied by
A
(n)
1 (s) ⊂ (A
(1)
1 )
n for every 1 ≤ s ≤ S(n). (35)
For n = 1 nothing has to be proved. For every n ≥ 2 we prove (35) by induction over s.
Let n ≥ 2 and s = 1. If an1 ∈ A
(n)
1 (1), then {a
n
1} is a hyperedge in H
(n)(0). As
H(n)(0) = H(1)(0)n, i. e. H(n)(0) is the n-fold square product of H(1)(0) with itself, this is
only possible if ai ∈ A
(1)
1 (1) ⊂ A
(1)
1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Now assume (35) is proven for all 1 ≤ σ ≤ s. Let an1 ∈ A
(n)
1 (s + 1), so that {a
n
1} is a
hyperedge in H(n)(s). This implies that there exists a hyperedge e(n) = {an1 , a
n
1,2, . . . , a
n
1,µ}
in H(n)(0) such that for every 2 ≤ ν ≤ µ there exists a 1 ≤ σν ≤ s such that a
n
1,ν ∈ A
(n)
1 (σν).
By the induction hypothesis, an1,ν ∈ (A
(1)
1 )
n for every ν.
Suppose an1 /∈ (A
(1)
1 )
n. Then ai /∈ A
(1)
1 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so ai ∈ A
(1)
2 . Hence for
every hyperedge e of H(1)(0) containing ai there is an ae ∈ A
(1)
2 not equal to ai such that
both ai and ae are contained in e.
Let {an1 , a˜
n
1,2, . . . , a˜
n
1,µ˜} be any hyperedge in H
(n)(0) containing an1 . As H
(n)(0) is the
n-fold square product of H(1)(0), there must be a 2 ≤ ν˜ ≤ µ˜ such that the i-th component
of a˜n1,ν˜ equals ae for one of the hyperedges e of H
(1)(0) containing ai. In particular, a
n
1,ν˜ /∈
(A
(1)
1 )
n. However, this contradicts the existence of the hyperedge e(n) = {an1 , a
n
1,2, . . . , a
n
1,µ}
in H(n)(0) which apart from an1 only contains elements of (A
(1)
1 )
n.
This proves the claim (35), in particular A
(n)
1 ⊂ (A
(1)
1 )
n. We therefore find that for
every n ∈ N, the number of messages that can be sent securely equals
N(TB ,TC)(n) = |A
n| − |A
(n)
1 | ≥ |A|
n − |A
(1)
1 |
n.
If A
(1)
1 is a strict subset of A, then
C0(TB ,TC) = lim
n→∞
logN(TB ,TC)(n)
n
= log|A|.
Otherwise, C0(TB ,TC) obviously equals 0. This proves Theorem 2.
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4.5 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 is based on the fact that the labelling of the encoding sets of an
M -code F is arbitrary. Let F be any (M,L, n)-code. k-fold concatenation of F with itself
gives a (Mk, L(k), kn)-code Fk. We show that the encoding sets of Fk can be labelled in
such a way that
L(k) =
Mk − 1
M − 1
L (36)
is possible. The idea is to order the messages k-tuples (m1, . . . ,mk) lexicographically. We
define this recursively: For k = 2, the message pair (m1,m2) gets the label
l(2)(m1,m2) =M(m1 − 1) +m2.
For k ≥ 2 we set
l(k+1)(m1, . . . ,mk+1) :=M(l
(k)(m1, . . . ,mk)− 1) +mk+1.
It is easy to check that the range of values of l(k) is {1, . . . ,Mk}.
For the concatenated code, we label the coding setF(m1)×· · ·×F(mk) with l
(k)(m1, . . . ,mk).
Let (c1, . . . , ckn) be an eavesdropper output sequence. As F is an (M,L, n)-code, for every
1 ≤ i ≤ n there are messagesmi,m
′
i satisfyingmi−m
′
i ≥ L−1 such that (c(i−1)n+1, . . . , cin)
is generated by both mi and m
′
i. It is easy to show by induction that the distance of
(m1, . . . ,mn) and (m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
n) according to the labelling function l
(k) is
l(k)(m1, . . . ,mn)− l
(k)(m′1, . . . ,m
′
n) ≥
Mk − 1
M − 1
L.
Observe now that
L(k) − 1
Mk − 1
−→
L
M − 1
from below as k →∞. Thus every ratio (L− 1)/(M − 1) can be improved by enlarging the
blocklength, which proves the claim of Lemma 3.
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